Post by account_disabled on Mar 13, 2024 9:33:48 GMT
The fiscal scenario for next year is paradigmatic in this regard: while the target of zero primary deficit constrains the Union's ability to carry out discretionary expenses and the Executive aims to maintain its investment agenda to a minimum within the scope of the growth acceleration program PAC Congress increased the amount allocated to individual bench and committee parliamentary amendments to R billion as can be read here and here
Contingent fiscal regimes follow one another frantically see the transition from a paradoxical tendency to stabilize and deepen relatively long-lasting movements despite their apparent annual fleetingness. When observing the sedimentation of flows that occurred over the last decade it is clear that the most important of these movements was the relative loss of deliberative space of the Executive Branch in the face of the Legislative Branch in relation to the increasingly narrow margin of allocative discretion. in the federal budget.
In LDO there was a relevant additional CG Leads step taken towards this infraconstitutional route of “budgetary parliamentarism” in Brazil. The biggest innovation was in establishing a precise schedule for the execution of parliamentary amendments prohibiting the Executive both from discriminating against eligible congressmen and from choosing whether and when to release the flow of such appropriations on the eve of the municipal electoral process.
The ordering of priorities and the timing of budget execution of parliamentary amendments which includes the indication of the CNPJ of the beneficiary entity have become rigid decisions normatively defined ex ante by the Legislative Branch as stipulated by the following articles -A and of the substitute for the federal PLDO approved by Congress :
º In the case of the previous paragraph the bodies and units responsible for execution must:
I – commit the expense within days from the end of the period provided for in item III of the caput; and
II – make full payment by June in the case of programs that add resources to automatic and regular transfers to be carried out by the Union to a federative entity in accordance with of art.
º Once settled expenses financed by resources arising from tax amendments including outstanding amounts to be paid will have priority for payment in relation to other discretionary expenses.”
Constitutional Amendments and promised progress in the relationship between the Legislature and the Executive throughout the various stages of the budget cycle as well as aiming to bring parliamentarians closer to their electoral bases in municipalities and states. The same promise is repeated again now with LDO... But the risks involved far outweigh the supposed benefits touted especially in the figure of the “special transfer” included in article -A for the purpose of flexible transfer of mandatory parliamentary amendments.
Contingent fiscal regimes follow one another frantically see the transition from a paradoxical tendency to stabilize and deepen relatively long-lasting movements despite their apparent annual fleetingness. When observing the sedimentation of flows that occurred over the last decade it is clear that the most important of these movements was the relative loss of deliberative space of the Executive Branch in the face of the Legislative Branch in relation to the increasingly narrow margin of allocative discretion. in the federal budget.
In LDO there was a relevant additional CG Leads step taken towards this infraconstitutional route of “budgetary parliamentarism” in Brazil. The biggest innovation was in establishing a precise schedule for the execution of parliamentary amendments prohibiting the Executive both from discriminating against eligible congressmen and from choosing whether and when to release the flow of such appropriations on the eve of the municipal electoral process.
The ordering of priorities and the timing of budget execution of parliamentary amendments which includes the indication of the CNPJ of the beneficiary entity have become rigid decisions normatively defined ex ante by the Legislative Branch as stipulated by the following articles -A and of the substitute for the federal PLDO approved by Congress :
º In the case of the previous paragraph the bodies and units responsible for execution must:
I – commit the expense within days from the end of the period provided for in item III of the caput; and
II – make full payment by June in the case of programs that add resources to automatic and regular transfers to be carried out by the Union to a federative entity in accordance with of art.
º Once settled expenses financed by resources arising from tax amendments including outstanding amounts to be paid will have priority for payment in relation to other discretionary expenses.”
Constitutional Amendments and promised progress in the relationship between the Legislature and the Executive throughout the various stages of the budget cycle as well as aiming to bring parliamentarians closer to their electoral bases in municipalities and states. The same promise is repeated again now with LDO... But the risks involved far outweigh the supposed benefits touted especially in the figure of the “special transfer” included in article -A for the purpose of flexible transfer of mandatory parliamentary amendments.